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Abstract 
The allowance allocation under the European Emission trading schemes differs fundamentally 
from earlier cap and trade programs, like SO2 and NOx in the USA. Because of the iterative 
nature of negotiations of the overall budget, the allocation also has to follow an iterative process. 
If power generators anticipate that their current behaviour will affect future allowance allocation, 
then this can distort today’s decisions. Furthermore, the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
contain multiple provisions dealing with existing installations, what happens to allocation when 
they close, and allocations to new entrants. We provide a framework to assess the economic 
incentives and distortions that provisions in NAPs can have on market prices, operation and 
investment decisions. To this end, we use both analytic models to illustrate the incentives effects 
and results from numerical simulation runs that estimate the magnitude of impacts from different 
allocation rules. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 25 National Allocation Plans (NAPs) established autonomously by the EU Member States 
(MS) are central to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). According to Articles 9 to 11 and 
Annex III of the ETS Directive1, NAPs must state how the total quantity of emissions allowances 
will be distributed to installations within their jurisdiction for each trading phase. The process of 
deciding the second phase allocation is currently underway. Each MS must submit their national 
allocation plans for 2008-2012 to the EU Commission by 30th June 2006. Over the subsequent 
three months period, these will be assessed by the Commission according to criteria outlined in 
the Directive.   
 
How to initially allocate allowances has long been a central issue in the debate on market-based 
instrument design. Since Montgomery put forward some thirty years ago that market efficiency 
would be independent of the initial allocation “modes” used to distribute tradable permits  
(Montgomery 1972), considerable advances have been made to further understanding of the 
implications of allocation to the functioning of the allowance market. Recent literature, primarily 
discussing allocation in the context of the US SO2 and NOx programmes, evaluates different 
allocation modes using analytical, empirical and comparative approaches (Ellerman et al. 2000). 
This literature gives support for the argument that allocation indeed matters: the choice of 
allocation mode has distributional effects, but also consequences for efficiency and hence the 
overall costs of emissions abatement. (Burtraw et al. 2001; Burtraw et al. 2002). However, the 
EU ETS is a unique undertaking compared with the US programmes on several grounds. 
Addressing these differences is crucial when applying insights from the existing literature to 
                                                 
1 Directive 2003/87/EC.  
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allocation issues in the EU ETS. Three key differences in particular increase the complexity with 
the EU ETS.      
 
Firstly, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme is by far the largest of its sort. Distributional 
considerations carry significant weight when giving away assets of such value to private sector 
agents. At CO2 prices of €11/t CO2, the annual value of emissions allowances reaches 
approximately €24 billion2. By law, auctioning is likely to remain small3. Certain modes of free 
allowance allocation can create incentives of some significance for rational firms in a 
competitive market to adjust decisions on operation, investment and closure in order to influence 
future allocations.  
 
Secondly, in most US programs allowances have been allocated at the beginning of the program, 
with a clear understanding that no subsequent allocation will take place. In sharp contrast to this 
‘one-off’ allocation the EU ETS adopts a sequential approach. Allocation plans are decided for 
one commitment period at a time, with repeated negotiations about the allocation for the 
following period. Although consistent with the iterative nature of international emission 
reduction negotiations, this allocation approach can have significant implications to efficiency of 
the market compared with one-off allocation. For example, it creates perverse incentives for CO2 
intensive plants to remain in operation in order to receive free-allocations, even if closure or 
replacement is socially more efficient. In addition, firms might invest in and operate more carbon 
intensive technologies if they anticipate that future allocations of allowances will be proportional 
                                                 
2 2.2 billion tonnes of annual CO2 emissions in Phase I (Commission, 2005) at spot EUA price of €11/tCO2 in April 
2006 (European Energy Exchange). 
3 A maximum of 5% and 10% of allowances may be auctioned in Phase I and II respectively under Articles 9 to 11 
and Annex III of the ETS Directive. This gradual incorporation of auctioning is incoherent with the fact that private 
and equity ownership are considerably lower in the EU, hence EU citizens are more likely to object to free-
allocation compared with US citizens. 
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to today’s emissions or output and fuel choice. This implies higher overall costs of emissions 
abatement.   
 
Thirdly, further complications are introduced due to the heterogeneity among allocation methods 
adopted across Europe. The theoretical arguments for harmonization are strong (Ãhman et al. 
2006). Under the current system where some discretion over NAPs is retained by each MS, we 
expect allocation rules will reflect national interest. For example, where the actions of a single 
MS is expected to have a small impact on the European CO2 price, national policies may be 
pursued with the objective of reducing impacts on domestic electricity prices. Pursuing the 
national objective can, however, have an adverse impact on CO2 emissions. If many countries set 
out to minimise electricity prices, increased demand for allowances pushes up prices in the EU 
ETS, increasing the overall costs of abatement for Europe. High CO2 prices, moreover, are likely 
to trigger some emission reductions among other market participants and increase use of 
international mechanisms (e.g. CDMs and JI).  
 
The potential complexity of allocation plans has thus reached new heights with the EU ETS. The 
objective of this paper is to draw a clear set of messages to guide future allocations from our 
detailed analysis of the financial incentives resulting from the allocation process for power 
generators in liberalized electricity markets. Because of the key role the electricity sector plays in 
determining the CO2 price and ultimately on the success of the overall scheme (electricity 
represents around 60% of overall emissions regulated under the EU ETS), insights from this 
sectoral study have useful bearing on other carbon intensive sectors covered by the scheme. 
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In this study, we use both analytic models to illustrate the incentives effects and results from 
numerical simulation runs that estimate the magnitude and the relative impacts of different 
allocation rules.  
 
We do not assess strategic behaviour of generators in the electricity, gas or CO2 market 
(Newbery 2005) but assume a competitive market. Power dispatch simulations of Great Britain 
(England, Wales and Scotland) and all of Europe are solved for the reference baseline - using 
permanent grandfathering and auctioning allocation methods. The base-case results are 
compared to results from simulations of alternative allocation scenarios, to demonstrate 
numerically the extent to which allocation can distort operation, investment, electricity prices 
and CO2 emissions. We do caution that there is some debate as to whether dominant generation 
companies in some European countries are restrained not by the competition from existing 
companies or new entrants, but by the threat of triggering regulatory intervention. Such 
companies can develop prices that mimic the prices of competitive markets. However, the threat 
of windfall profit taxes, the anticipation of the impact of their current behaviour on the ongoing 
negotiations about allowance allocation for future periods, or the link to developments in other 
sectors of energy policy might induce such companies to refrain from adding opportunity costs 
of CO2 prices to the wholesale price level of electricity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the reference case, 
which mimics the results of an efficient cap and trade program, and then discuss the distortions 
that result due to the allocation to existing power stations. Section 3 deals with new entrants. 
Section 4 sets out some conclusions.  
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2. Allocation to Incumbents 
 
For the Phase I trading period, incumbent firms received allowances based on their historic 
emissions. Most member states took some average over a three to five year period between 1990 
and 2002. For future trading periods the Member States have to again define NAPs for the ETS.4 
The commission and various member states announced that current behaviour will not be basis 
for future allocations, and it is indeed unlikely that behaviour post 2005 will be used for 
allocations in the period 2008-2012. It is however difficult for governments to commit to not 
redefining allocation methods and base periods in future. It is likely that the base period will be 
adjusted over time to reflect changes in distribution of plants over time. It is for example difficult 
to envisage that in 2011 a government will decide to allocate allowances to a power plant that 
closed down in 2003. This suggests that some element of ‘updating’ of allocation plans cannot 
be avoided if such plans are made sequentially. 
 
A consistent methodology of allocating allowances is therefore likely to make allocation 
contingent on past activities of a plant. We show that such contingent allocation has detrimental 
impacts on the efficiency of emission trading, that vary with the specific allocation methodology. 
The incentives the allocation methodology creates for seperation of power plants has been 
extensively discussed (Bernard et al. 2001; Palmer and Burtraw 2003; Palmer and Burtraw 2004; 
Entec and NERA 2005; Keats and Neuhoff 2005). This section extends this discussion by 
addressing issues specific to the EU ETS.  
                                                 
4 Defined by the Kyoto process (e.g. 2005-2007, 2008-2012) 
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2.1 The ‘updating dilemma’ 
We begin by presenting a theoretical framework for evaluating the impact of updating before 
moving on to quantify its impacts. To illustrate the effect of updating, consider a generation 
system with various technologies. In our auction base case, as the CO2 price increases, the 
generation portfolio will shift towards less carbon intensive power generation. The trace of the 
relationship between CO2 price and resulting CO2 emissions is referred to as the marginal 
abatement cost curve (MACC), as shown in Figure 1. With updating, the emitter receives some 
future allowances with today’s emissions.  The value of this future allocation will drive a wedge 
(indicated by the area labelled “future value”) between the market price of CO2 allowances and 
the polluter’s internal opportunity cost. This can be represented as an upward shift of the MACC. 
The CO2 market price must therefore rise to ensure the CO2 budget is not violated (See 
Boeringer and Lange, (2005)).  
 
 
Figure 1 Impact of updating on marginal abatement cost curve 
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From the perspective of one country, using policies that promise updating is a tempting option. 
Emissions from the country will have little effect on the ETS price. Yet by adding future value, 
updating essentially provides an output subsidy that reduces the variable cost of the economic 
activity. Thus national efforts to reduce economic activity and hence CO2 emissions are reduced. 
Updating can therefore have adverse effects on emission levels, for example, by biasing 
investments in carbon-intensive technologies (e.g. coal). Moreover, if the demand for electricity 
is price elastic, any resulting drop in electricity prices (Harrison and Radov 2002) could trigger 
higher electricity consumption, production, further increasing CO2 emissions.   
 
This approach will also have consequences on neighbouring jurisdictions. Figure 2 illustrates a 
case with two countries. Each country is characterised by a marginal abatement cost curve and 
emission budget. Imagine that equilibrium prices coincide in both countries, even in the absence 
of trade at point X. The right side of Figure 2 illustrates that with international trade the 
individual marginal abatement cost curves and the budgets are added, and obviously the same 
equilibrium price results.  
 
budget Bbudget A
Country A Country B
tCO2
MACCs with Grandfathering
tCO2
joint emission budget
tCO2
€/
tCO2 MACC with Updating
EA1 EB1EA2 EB2
X
Y
EA + EB  
Figure 2 Impact of updating in a two-country emission trading system 
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If one country, say Country B, employs updating, then a wedge is created between CO2 price and 
opportunity costs of CO2 emissions. As companies’ opportunity cost of reducing CO2 emissions 
is not affected, the MACC has to shift upwards. When we allow trading of allowances between 
the two countries, the joint MACC also shifts upwards. The market now clears at the new 
equilibrium Y with higher CO2 prices.  How this joint equilibrium is reflected in national output 
choices can be seen by moving along the dashed line from point Y to the left. The resulting CO2 
price in Country A is higher and the country will implement additional CO2 emission reductions 
equal to EA1 - EA2. The CO2 prices will also be higher in Country B, but as the MACC has been 
shifted up even further, the country increases its emissions of CO2 by EB2- EB1. The global 
budget ensures that the total emission reductions are not affected. Comparing the shaded areas 
under the MACCs, it is clear that savings made in Country B are outweighed by the additional 
abatement costs incurred by Country A.  
 
One might argue that Country B or its companies ‘pay’ for these additional abatement efforts of 
Country A. However in the process Country B introduces a wedge, reducing the marginal 
opportunity costs for its industry and consumers at the expense of higher ‘international’ CO2 
price and thus higher marginal opportunity costs for foreign industry and consumers. This might 
be referred to as ‘free-riding’ on others’ emissions reductions.  
 
Ahman et al. (2006) recognise that individual Member States’ decisions on NAPs affect the 
overall efficiency of the system, and also that a strong EU approval process of NAPs is required 
to limit distortions from heterogeneity of NAPs. In addition, the application of updating is not 
limited to cross-border distortions. Similar arguments can be made about allocation procedures 
that differ across sectors (see Keats and Neuhoff 2005).  
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Acknowledging the problems associated with defining future allocations as a function of output 
levels in the past, some governments have declared that they will not allow the use of updating. 
For such announcements to be credible, however, governments must clearly outline what 
approach they envisage for future allocation. 
 
2.2 Quantifying impacts  
2.2.1 Base case – auctioning or perfect grandfathering 
Various studies have modelled the impact of CO2 allowances on the European power sector (see 
for example Sijm et al, this issue). To quantify the impact of CO2 allowances on both the GB and 
the EU power sector we use ICF Consulting’s Integrated Planning Model (IPM®). It is a linear 
programming model that selects generating and investment options to meet overall electricity 
demand today and on an ongoing basis over the chosen planning horizon at minimum cost. For 
the GB simulations, England, Wales and Scotland are treated as an island with no electrical 
interconnection to its neighbours. In the European simulations, IPM is designed to replicate the 
operations of the interconnected European power system using an accurate engineering 
representation of power plants, transmission links and fuel supply options.  
 
In order to calculate the distortions induced by the NAPs we have to define a reference or base 
case. In our base case we assume that all allowances are auctioned. This base case creates the 
same investment, operation and closure decisions as a one-off allocation of free allowances.5 The 
‘only’ difference between auctioning and permanently allocating allowances are the rents 
transferred from government to historic emitters. In this paper we do not discuss the mix of 
auctioning and free allocation required to compensate power companies for the effect of the CO2 
                                                 
5 Most of the US cap and trade programs for SO2 and NOx used such a one-off allocation. Given the larger value of 
CO2 allowances, the novel experience with a CO2 trading scheme and the iterative nature of the definition of 
national or regional targets such a permanent allocation was not viable under the ETS. 
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emission trading scheme (see Keats and Neuhoff 2005). This does not apply to companies in 
regulated market environments or in situations where companies are exposed to regulatory 
threats, e.g. windfall profits. In the extreme case of pure auctions, companies will face the full 
costs and can pass these on. With complete free allocation there is little impact on their average 
costs and thus on prices (Burtraw et al. 2005). Results for the auctioning case and the no CO2 
case are shown in Figure 3. 
(a) CO2 Emissions (MMTonnes)       (b) Baseload Electricity Price (€ 2005/MWh) 
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Figure 3 CO2 Emissions and Baseload Price with Auctioning Base Case (GB only) 
Note:  CO2 prices fixed at 20€/tCO2. 
 
2.2.2 Updating with an out-put based uniform benchmark 
To update allocation, governments may consider using benchmarks. How does the choice of 
benchmark impact electricity prices and CO2 emissions? We start by quantifying impacts of the 
simplest form of updating: using an output-based uniform benchmark (OB, UB). In this case, the 
allocation in the following compliance period is equal to the product of the benchmark and 
electricity production in the preceding compliance period (Palmer and Burtraw 2004). To avoid 
distortions between any sources of power generation the uniform benchmark also envisages the 
allocation of CO2 allowances to low carbon technologies like wind, hydro, solar or nuclear.  
 
                    
 
 12
The simulation results for GB presented in this section assume that all power stations receive for 
free, an allowance of 0.35 tCO2 per MWh electricity produced in the preceding compliance 
period. This benchmark is phased out linearly so that by 2023 no further allocation is received. 
In the model it is also assumed that GB is small relative to the European market such that even 
with changing GB emissions the CO2 price stays at €20 /tCO2.  The simulation results in Figure 
4 show that the electricity price increases but by far less than in the auction case.   
(a) CO2 Emissions (MMTonnes)   (b) Baseload Electricity Price (Euro 2005/MWh)  
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Figure 4 CO2 Emissions and Baseload Price with Updating Using an Output-Based Uniform Benchmark (GB 
only, €20/tCO2) 
 
Figure 4 also shows the impact on CO2 emissions was very small when compared to the auction 
case. While lowering electricity prices, updating using an output-based uniform benchmark does 
not result in any significant increase in CO2 emissions. The benefits of future allocation reduced 
the production costs of operation resulting in a reduction in prices without affecting the dispatch 
order. Output-based updating therefore acts as a production subsidy (Fisher 2001). 
 
This, however, may not be the whole story. For modelling purposes we assumed that demand 
was exogenous. In reality electricity demand is price elastic, especially in the mid and long term, 
when higher prices induce more energy efficient investment. Hence we expect electricity 
demand to increase with the output based updating. To meet this additional demand, more 
generation is required resulting in an increase in CO2 emissions.  
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For modelling purposes we also assumed a fixed CO2 price did not constrain CO2 emissions. 
However, if updating increases CO2 emissions on a European scale, then allowance prices will 
appreciate, and this in turn will compensate for (some) of the previous electricity price 
reductions. 
 
2.2.3 Updating with a fuel-specific benchmark 
As basing Phase II allocation on activities in Phase I is explicitly prohibited by the EU Directive, 
some MSs update allocations using fuel-specific benchmarks (FSB) where the benchmark is set 
higher for coal-fired plants than for gas-fired plants. Here, we assess the impact of this 
alternative updating method and compare with the output-based uniform benchmark approach.  
 
In our model gas-fired plants receive 0.35 tCO2 and the coal-fired power stations receive 0.75 t 
CO2 per MWh generated in the preceding compliance period.6 The results for our GB simulation 
are shown in Figure 5. The fuel-specific updating scenario leads to higher CO2 emissions and 
electricity price are lower because of the output subsidy but CO2 emissions are significantly 
above the auctioning case. 
(a) CO2 Emissions (MMTonnes)    (b) Baseload Electricity Price (€ 2005/MWh)  
                                                 
6 Although technology-specific benchmarks may be intended as incentives for clean technologies, at the same time, 
it also provides channels to make “concessions” for technologies and sites that cannot achieve lower emission 
targets (Entec and NERA, 2005) 
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Figure 5 CO2 Emissions and Baseload Price with Updating Using an Fuel-Specific Benchmark (GB only, 
20€/tCO2) 
 
2.2.4 Updating in an International context 
To test the net impact that updating can have on the efficiency of the EU ETS as a whole, we 
simulate four scenarios for all countries in Europe. The IPM treats the electricity dispatch system 
as a system of integrated and interconnected markets. It assumes that the competitive market 
allows for the optimal operation decisions of power stations across multiple jurisdictions. The 
first scenario defines the business-as-usual case (“No CO2 control”), and the second simulates a 
situation where all European countries use allocation by auctioning and a price of €20/t CO2. For 
the final two cases, we apply different allocation methodologies to the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands: first an output-based uniform benchmark, and then a fuel-specific benchmark.  All 
other European countries continue to auction allowances. The impact of updating in these three 
countries on CO2 emissions is reported for 2008-2012 in Figure 6 below.   
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Figure 6 CO2 Emissions with Base Case, Updating Using Output-Based Uniform Benchmark and Fuel-
Specific Benchmark for Europe (EU23+10), England and Wales, Germany and The Netherlands (20€/tCO2, 
2008-2012 only) 
 
On an overall European scale, the results show that updating using an output-based uniform 
benchmark in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands has a smaller impact on emissions than 
using a fuel-specific benchmark in the same three countries.  The no CO2 control case results in 
the highest emissions. Emissions were lowest with all countries adopting the auctioning 
approach. 
 
Comparing the impact of different allocation procedures for the three individual countries we 
observe a similar behaviour in Germany and England & Wales. Distortions in the allocation 
process mean that CO2 emissions increase from the auction to the output based uniform 
benchmark case and then again to the output based fuel specific benchmark case. Emissions are 
highest in the no CO2 control case. The Netherlands proved a special case with emissions in the 
BAU case lying below the auction case. Two explanations underlie these results: First, the large 
share of gas-fired plants makes the Netherlands a preferred country for electricity generation 
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under emission trading. Second, the high level of interconnection with neighbouring countries 
allows trade to utilise this opportunity.  
 
These numerical simulations provide useful insight into the magnitude of distortions induced by 
allocation to the power sector. Since the CO2 emissions cap for Europe is fixed, high CO2 
emissions projections imply increased scarcity and allowance prices. This could induce increased 
flow of allowances through the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, including Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). The extent to which CO2 prices 
would have to adjust to achieve the same level of European-wide emissions is a question in need 
of further research. 
 
2.3 Closure Rules: the impact of ‘contingent allocation’ 
With a permanent allocation, the ownership of the allowances remains unaffected by closure of 
the power station. If the continued operation of a plant is no longer profitable, then owners can 
sell the allowances and close the plant.  
 
Closure decisions are distorted if allocation of allowance is contingent on activity level of a 
plant. Plant owners retain plants on the system and continue operation at minimum run 
conditions in order to receive allowances in the next trading period7  
 
In addition, most countries, with the exception of Sweden and the Netherlands, explicitly include 
closure rules within their NAPs. For example in Germany, entities that close down operations 
(defined as emitting less than 10% of its average annual baseline emissions) will not receive 
allowances from the following year. Such formal closure rules further discourage the closure of 
                                                 
7 To address such distortions, Ahman et al (2006) propose a “The Ten Year Rule” which they argue can parallel 
incentives of permanent grandfathering hence eliminate the trade-off between updating and permanent allocation.    
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inefficient plants within a trading period, as allocation essentially becomes a subsidy for 
continued production (Ãhman et al. 2006).  
 
These closure rules have consequences for the power system. First, with more plants staying on 
the system, there is more electricity supply and therefore prices can initially be reduced. 
Secondly, as inefficient old plants are artificially retained on the system, investment in more 
efficient new plants is delayed. This increases power prices and CO2 emissions. 
 
We quantify the impact of the implicit closure rules for the Great Britain electricity system: If a 
power plant closes it does not receive any allocation in the following compliance period. Table 1 
lists the initial annual allocation of allowances to the different technologies. We assume that this 
is the allowance allocation for the period 2005-2008 and will be linearly phased out until 2028. 
We again fix the CO2 price at €20/t CO2.  
 
Initial allocation 
(tCO2/MWyr)
CCGT (combined cycle gas turbine) 1,893
OCGT (open cycle gas turbine) 473
Hydro (pumped storage or pondage hydro); 0
Diesel generator 947
Nuclear 0
Renewables 0
Conventional coal boiler 2,840
Conventional steam turbine (burning fossil fuel other than coal) 1,420
Table 1 Assumed Initial Allocation to Incumbents for Period 2005-2007   
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Comparing results for the cases where allocation of allowances is contingent on plant existence 
during the 3-5 year allocation period with the base case (auction or permanent grandfathering) 
the number of retirements of plants falls. With no CO2 constraint only 0.4GW of capacity was 
retired for economic reasons.  In the auction case, 7.1 GW of capacity is retired by 2015 and 
14.2GW by 2022. In contrast, free allocation to existing plants reduces cumulative retirements to 
2.5GW and 7.2GW over the same periods. This reduces the investment in new lower carbon 
plant. For our parameter choice we did not observe strong effects of contingent allocation on 
CO2 emissions. Power prices are slightly lower in the contingent allocation case. As the later 
scenario analysis for new entrant allocation illustrates, such results can drastically change with 
small changes to the parameter choices.  
 
2.5 Summary of allocation to existing facilities 
The allocation procedures applied by National Allocation Plans combine various aspects 
discussed in this section. Figure 7 illustrates and summarises the transition from an efficient 
allocation based on auction (or permanent grand fathering) to the various dimensions of 
distortions that are created by the iterative grandfathering approach using a moving baseline in 
current national allocation plans.  
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Figure 7 Effect of Allocation Methods to Power Sector Incumbents 
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The economically efficient allocation methods are auctions or a one-off free allocation of 
allowances. The first set of distortions is introduced if allowances are only allocated in the future, 
if the power stations are operational today. The value of future allocations delays closure of 
plants beyond the socially efficient lifespan. This effect is reinforced if the amount of allocation 
is increasing with the CO2 intensity of the technology. With such technology specific allocation 
more CO2 intensive technologies receive additional encouragement to stay operational, further 
delaying the shift towards less CO2 intensive power stations.  
 
The second set of distortions follows, if the amount of future allocations is related to current 
electricity production. A uniform benchmark would not create distortions between the operation 
of different technologies. In our model the uniform updating resulted in lower electricity prices. 
We did not look at the impact on electricity demand and implied changes of CO2 emissions. 
Output based updating also implements a closure condition – only power stations that produce 
will receive allowances in the future. Thus it creates some distortions discussed above. Many of 
the discussions about output-based benchmarks assumed that these benchmarks are fuel or 
technology specific. Updating based on such benchmarks does create strong distortions in the 
operation and can create significant increases of CO2 emissions.  
 
Reality can offer even more distortions. The allocation of CO2 allowances in Phase I of the EU 
ETS was based on base line CO2 emissions and the current discussions surrounding Phase II 
indicate that this will remain the dominant metric. Among our model runs the fuel specific 
benchmark using a moving base line best reflects the distortions created by the emission based 
NAPs assuming they also use a moving base line. The emission based updating creates 
additional distortions not captured by our model run. First, it reduces the incentive to operate the 
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more efficient power stations of the same fuel type.  This may not be a large problem as 
generators typically prefer to run more fuel efficient power stations. Second, the emission-based 
allocation reduces the incentives to invest in efficiency improvements of existing and new power 
stations.  
 
As the European budget for CO2 emissions is capped, if many Member States implement this 
allocation methodology, increases of national emissions are likely to push up the European price 
of CO2 allowances. They in turn increase the electricity prices across all states, thus the subsidy-
effect of free allocation that lowers electricity prices is partly offset.  
 
3. Allocation to New Entrants 
 
We assess the economic incentives and their impacts resulting from allocation to new projects of 
power generators. All MS have made provisions that guarantee a certain volume of free 
allowances to new entrants for a defined period. Section 3.1 uses a simple analytic model to 
illustrate the impact of a uniform allocation of CO2 allowances to all new projects, section 3.2 
discusses how increased allocation to coal affect the equilibrium. In section 3.3 we then use a 
numerical model to calculate the impacts of different allocation schemes in the UK and 
European system, taking into consideration the existing assets and investment pathways. Finally 
section 3.4 summarises the results of all model runs. 
  
NE provisions are often viewed as a “general” or “synthetic” compensation mechanism in the 
EU ETS. For example, by encouraging firms to establish new sources rather than to expand 
operation of existing facilities, it aims in part to compensate for distortions created by closure 
conditions including delaying the shift towards new efficient investment. Also it sometimes 
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argued that NE provisions create ‘fairness’ among incumbents and new entities; if existing 
facilities receive allowances, so should new facilities. Barriers to entry for new firms due to 
inadequate liquidity in the market may be a more appropriate but also difficult justification for 
NE allocations (Baron and Bygrave 2002). Free NE allocations compensate for the direct 
additional costs incurred by new entrants to the market. By improving their access to capital, free 
allowances can facilitate entry by new firms, hence NE reserves address wider issues of market 
power (Ãhman et al. 2006) and thus increase competition within rather concentrated national 
European electricity markets (Ãhman and Zetterberg 2003); Pedersen (2002) in (Baron and 
Bygrave, 2002). As most new projects are initiated by existing utilities, the expression new 
entrant allocation seems a bit misleading and could perhaps be replaced by new project 
allocation in future discussions.  
 
Most Phase I NAPs provide for NE allocations based on a general emission rate and forecasted 
activity level. For example in the Netherlands (NL), new entrants are allocated allowances based 
on projected output or fixed cap factor multiplied with uniform emission rate in line with that of 
a CCGT.  In France Germany and Poland, CO2 intensive power generators like coal-fired 
installations receive the highest number of allowances per kW installed.  The literature highlights 
the danger that NE provisions can create distortions (Harrison and Radov 2002). In order to 
illustrate how these rules can impact electricity prices, and CO2 emissions on our GB simulations, 
we focus on two approaches: one based on a uniform benchmark and one based on fuel-specific 
benchmark.  In both cases the forecasted capacity factor of new entrants is fixed at 60%. 
 
3. 1 New entrant allocation with a uniform benchmark 
To illustrate the impact of new entrant allocation we calculate the long-term investment 
equilibrium for a competitive electricity market. Section 3.3 will subsequently assess the impact 
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in real electricity markets where existing generation assets do effect the generation and price 
structure.  
In our simplified model we assume that the highest prices are set by demand side response, 
followed a combined cycle gas turbines with high variable and low fixed costs and coal power 
stations with low variable and high fixed costs. We compare two cases. First, the system is small 
relative to the EU emission-trading scheme and the EU CO2 price is not affected by changes in 
national emissions of CO2.  Second, the model represents the entire EU ETS, and we set a fixed 
CO2 budget and endogenously determined CO2 price.  
 
The results with uniform NE allocation are shown in Figure 8. With a fixed allowance price, as 
the value of the NE allocations increases, additional gas power stations replace peaking 
generation, usually provided by open cycle gas turbines, or demand response as the value of the 
allocation increases. The electricity price falls and CO2 emissions fall. Nevertheless, at a certain 
value of total NE allowances (between €40 and €50/Kw/hr), the option for CCGT to replace 
peakers is exhausted and it becomes viable to invest in a new coal-powered stations. From this 
point onwards, coal-fired power stations are built in preference to CCGT. This results in 
significant increases in CO2 emissions even as electricity prices continue to fall. 
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Figure 8 Long-term equilibrium effect of increasing levels of uniform new entrant allocation 
 
The right hand side of Figure 8 shows what happens if same uniform new entrant allocation 
provision is applied at the European level, i.e. when the CO2 budget is fixed. When the value of 
the new entrant allocation is sufficiently high that construction of new coal powered stations is 
made viable, with a fixed CO2 cap, however, the equilibrium price of CO2 will increase and the 
higher exposure of coal power stations to CO2 prices reduces the expected benefit of operating 
the coal power station. This prevents the additional construction of coal-powered stations. 
Higher CO2 prices, however, feed through to higher electricity prices. 
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3. 2 New entrant allocation with a fuel-specific benchmark 
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of a fuel-specific new entrant allocation in the long-run equilibrium. 
With a fixed CO2 price, the additional support for coal-powered stations implies that even small 
values of new entrant allocation result in incentives to replace gas with coal powered stations. 
Over a mid to long-term time horizon, this increases national CO2 emissions and lowers 
electricity prices. With a fixed CO2 budget, the cap on total emissions implies that CO2 prices 
must rise. The higher CO2 prices again feed through to higher electricity prices.  
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Figure 9 Long-term equilibrium effect of increasing levels of fuel-specific new entrant allocation 
This analysis highlights the dangers of a fuel-specific new entrant allocation at the European 
level. In equilibrium, fuel-specific benchmarking increases the social costs of complying with 
the CO2 cap.  
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3.3 Aggregate impact on CO2 emission and electricity prices for Europe  
We also used the IPM to assess how updating and new entrant allocation can affect the evolution 
of the power system in England and Wales for a series of cases with a fixed CO2 price. For 2005-
2007, NE allocation based on a uniform benchmark assumes a benchmark rate of 0.35t CO2 per 
MWh for all power plants together with an annual load factor of 60% for both technologies.  The 
fuel-specific NE allocation assumes 0.75 t CO2 per MWh for new coal-fired plants. The 
allocation drops linearly over time so that by 2028 NE would have to purchase all their 
allowances from the market. Figure 10 summarises the results, which are taken from our 
European simulation.  In these Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were all subject to the 
alternative allocation method whilst all other countries applied auctioning or perfect 
grandfathering. 
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Figure 10 Effect of various allocation methods on England & Wales CO2 emissions in period 2008-2012 
(assuming fixed CO2 price) 
 
Starting with a base case assuming no updating or NE allocation, CO2 emissions decrease when 
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a NE allocation is used. The allocation results in accelerated construction and operation of 
combined cycle gas turbines and thus lower CO2 emissions. For our given set of input 
parameters, the results for uniform-benchmark or fuel-specific benchmark were the same.  The 
subsidy to coal was not large enough to justify any construction of new coal. The resulting 
reduction in CO2 emissions, however, could be dramatically reversed. When we increased the 
price of natural gas above 4.9 €/MMBTu and assumed that there would be no fall in the 
allocation over time, coal became the preferred new build option.  Emissions of CO2 would 
increase above the No CO2 and fuel-specific updating cases. The implementation of uniform 
updating did not effect emissions. If however updating is fuel specific, e.g. producers with coal 
power stations expect higher future allocations than producers with gas, then dispatch decisions 
are distorted and emissions increase.  
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Figure 11 Effect of various allocation methods on England & Wales prices in period 2008-2012 (assuming 
fixed CO2 price) 
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Figure 11 illustrates the impact on electricity prices of the different allocation methods for the 
same England & Wales cases. The simulations are run on the assumption that European CO2 
prices are not affected by the changes of CO2 emissions in the UK. If various EU countries 
implement allocation plans that would increase national CO2 emissions, then this assumption is 
no longer valid, and CO2 prices will rise and feed through to higher electricity prices.  
 
3.4 Summary of the numerical results  
Figure 12 summarises the impact of different allocation methods examined for our GB 
simulation which are based on the assumption that the UK emission pattern will have limited 
impact on the European allowance price which is therefore set as fixed. 
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Average CO2 
emissions 
(million tCO2) 
Average 
baseload prices 
(€/MWh) 
Cumulative 
retirements 
(MW) 
Average Gas 
use (TBTU) 
Average Coal 
use (TBTU) 
No Closure test, 
High FS NER, 
High Gas price 241 45.26 12,977 359 1,623 
No CO2 226 32.79 556 1,221 1,628 
FS Upd, No 
NER 215 37.01 5,118 1,325 1,440 
Closure test, No 
NER 187 43.28 3,318 1,694 946 
Closure test, Uni 
NER 180 41.86 3,678 1,766 829 
Closure test, FS 
NER 180 41.86 3,678 1,766 829 
Uni Upd, No 
NER 178 39.72 10,640 1,804 776 
Auctioning Base 
Case 178 43.96 10,629 1,798 780 
No Closure test, 
Uni NER 170 41.81 20,597 1,863 670 
No Closure test, 
FS NER 170 41.81 20,597 1,863 670 
Figure 12 Impact from allocations for period 2005-2017 (GB simulation only) 
 
Uniform allocation of allowances creates the fewest distortions for both incumbents and new 
entrants. For a fixed CO2 price the uniform benchmarks for allocation to existing and new 
facilities resulted in a reduction of electricity prices with limited impact on CO2 emissions. We 
caution that this ‘optimistic’ result is based on price independent electricity demand and our 
assumptions on available technologies and fuel prices. Furthermore, the reduction of electricity 
prices is typically far lower than the value of the free allowances, as investors and operators 
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discount CO2 price and regulatory uncertainty. Thus uniform allocation of allowances can be 
interpreted as an inefficient capacity payment scheme.  
 
Fuel-specific benchmarks applied to existing power stations create incentives to shift production 
towards more CO2 intensive generators. Whether we refer to fuel-specific updating or NE 
allocation, for any given price of CO2, these allocation methods will result in CO2 emissions in 
excess of the auctioning case. If operators and investors expect that future national allocation 
plans are similar to current national allocation plans, then they anticipate receiving fuel specific 
allocation in the future. If the CO2 budget were fixed, this would imply that CO2 prices, and 
hence electricity prices, would have to rise. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates the set of distortions that can result from allocation of CO2 allowances to 
existing facilities and new entrants in the form of closure rules where allocation is lost once the 
facility shuts down, updating where allocation in forthcoming compliance periods is a function 
of generation or emissions levels today, and allocations to new entrants based on alternative 
benchmarks..  
 
We illustrated the set of distortions that can result from allocation of CO2 allowances to existing 
facilities and new entrants.  
 
The first set of distortions is introduced with uniform updating (e.g. based on past power output). 
From a national perspective, assuming fixed CO2 prices, free allowances reduce the opportunity 
costs (updating) or scarcity prices (new entrant allocation) and thus feed through to somewhat 
lower electricity prices. The regulatory uncertainty involved in the future benefit might imply 
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that the decrease in electricity prices might be far lower than the value of allowances handed out. 
The failure to internalise the CO2 externality into the electricity prices limits investment in 
energy efficiency and results in higher electricity consumption. Thus electricity production and 
national CO2 emissions increase. If all European countries implement such policies the suggested 
higher CO2 emissions would translate into higher CO2 prices and feed through to higher 
electricity prices.  
 
Overall, a purely uniform allocation of allowances creates the fewest distortions for both 
incumbents and new entrants. A similar approach for both facilities would increase transparency 
and avoid difficulties of defining what a new entrant is relative to an existing facility (Entec and 
NERA 2005). However, this does not suggest that it is desirable from an equity perspective, as 
power generators might receive free allowances above the level they require to cover any 
additional costs from the emission-trading scheme.  
 
A justification for the free allocation of allowances is that they are used to compensate emitters 
for otherwise reduced profitability due to the introduction of ETS. This would argue for fuel and 
technology specific allocation. Relative to the distortions created by uniform benchmarking this 
has the following impacts. Fuel specific benchmarks applied to existing power stations create 
incentives to shift production towards more CO2 intensive generators. This can increase CO2 
emissions, and if applied on a European scale it can increase CO2 prices. These feed through to 
higher electricity prices.  
 
Fuel specific allocation to new entrants creates additional incentives to invest in CO2 intensive 
power stations. The long-term equilibrium model illustrated, that if investors are forward looking 
they anticipate that any additional construction of coal power stations would result in additional 
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operation of the power station. The fixed EU allowance budget prevents additional CO2 
emissions and would thus push up CO2 prices to a level at which investment in CO2 intensive 
power stations is unprofitable. Thus fuel specific new entrant allocation increases CO2 and 
electricity prices.  
 
Allocation relative to past emissions is prevalent in current national allocation plans. If such 
direct updating is to continue, then the incentives ETS could have on existing power stations to 
increase fuel and CO2 efficiency are severely reduced. Any improvement will reduce the future 
allowance allocation. The announcement of the Commission from May 2006 to use 2005 
emission data in the evaluation of national allocation plans for the period 2008-2012 illustrates 
that policy makers cannot credibly commit to ignoring available information in the allocation 
process.8  
 
We note that national allocation plans were designed in anticipation of some of these distortions. 
The national allocation plans aimed to counter some of these distortions, e.g. by transfer 
provisions between power stations. However, it seems impossible to comprehensively address 
the complex set of interactions of incentives from various provisions in NAPs. Any such 
assessment tends to be valid for only one scenario.   
 
Nevertheless, despite the complex interactions, we have shown that it is possible with the aid of 
simulation tools to make an assessment of the distortionary impact of allocation procedures both 
at the national and international level.  These approaches provide a useful tool to policy makers 
as they try to seek to design new provisions for forthcoming NAPs. Our numerical calculation 
for the UK assuming a fixed CO2 price illustrated how quantitative results can invert with a 
                                                 
8 Source: Pointcarbon, 15.5.2006 
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change in the assumption of gas prices and investors expectations. This suggests that it is rather 
tricky to micro manage national allocation plans with the well-intended objective to correct for 
inappropriate incentives following from individual provisions.  
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